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A B S T R A C T
The occurrence of in-house unnatural death could negatively affect the value of housing property. This study
evaluates the geographic and temporal scope of the impact of unnatural death on property values in Hong Kong.
By exploiting the spatial and intertemporal variation of the shock in a difference-in-differences approach, we find
significant negative externalities of unnatural death incidence on neighborhood housing values. On average, units
in which an unnatural death occurred experience a 25% drop in value following the death. Nearby units on the
same floor also show a significant price drop of 4.5%. Prices of units on other floors of the same building decline
about 2.6%. Units in other buildings of the same estate observe a price decline of about 1% on average. However,
the price for nearby estates within 300m shows a positive impact of 0.5%, suggesting a very localized sorting
mechanism. Temporally, price evolution after death incidence follows a U shape. Housing prices continue to
decline up to 4–5 years after deaths and recover gradually afterwards. We also document the heterogeneity of the
impact by the type of death incidence (murder, suicide, or accident) and the type of homebuyers (local buyer,
investment firm, and other buyers). We find that the negative externalities of death incidence are largely due to a
severe stigma effect, rather than channels through the revealed crime risk or the price contagion effect.
1. Introduction
Households choose where to live and which units to buy by assessing
a bundle of housing attributes. Aside from commonly observed features,
like floor space, number of rooms, and nearby amenities, many intangible
features, such as perceived neighborhood crime risk, attitudes toward a
certain ethnic group, and psychological perceptions of stigma tagged to a
unit, also play a significant role in affecting a household's preference for
the unit. Among the latter type of features, information revealed on
previous in-house unnatural deaths could substantially reduce the will-
ingness to pay for a unit as well as other units in close proximity. This
outcome could be because (1) unnatural deaths, especially those result-
ing from violent crimes, reveal high crime risks associated with the
neighborhood; (2) in-house deaths could generate prolonged external-
ities associated with the death stigma, having a negative psychological
impact on those living in close proximity; and (3) shocks imposed on the
price of a particular unit may create contagion effects that affect nearby
housing values.
There is extensive literature documenting households’ averting
behavior against revealed crime risk and/or potential stigma effects that
follow the revealed risk. For example, Linden and Rockoff (2008) and
Pope (2008) show that house values fall by 2.3–4% following the
move-in of a registered sex offender in close proximity. Congdon-Hoh-
man (2013) and Dealy et al. (2017) find that house prices drop sub-
stantially following the discovery of a methamphetamine lab and a
long-lasting stigma effect remains even after the decontamination of
those labs. However, few studies thus far have considered the direct
impact of unnatural deaths on nearby property prices, even though such
deaths occur at high frequency, are often connected to crime or suicide,
and generate substantial neighborhood disruptions. In particular, deaths
from violent crimes trigger strong emotional disturbance and disperse
fears about possible murders in the community. In addition, unnatural
deaths from suicide might have a strong physiological impact on a
neighborhood especially one in which there are strong beliefs in ghosts
and the afterlife.
So (2007) analyzes the externalities of unnatural death on properties
values by using seven large-scale housing estates in Hong Kong from
1991 to 2006. Although he finds negative effects of unnatural death on
property values, his hedonic regression method is likely to yield biased
results, as unnatural deaths are likely to correlate with unobservable
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factors of housing estates. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) adopt a
difference-in-differences (DID) approach to estimate the negative effect
of haunted houses on nearby houses within major large-scale estates in
Hong Kong. The authors also find negative externalities of unnatural
deaths, and some of their main findings are consistent with our estima-
tion in this study. However, their estimation largely focuses on short-run
effects. They also ignore multiple treatment issues, which could under-
estimate the real effect. Our study overcomes these weaknesses and
provides a more comprehensive understanding of the geographic and
intertemporal scope and mechanism of housing externalities caused by
unnatural death incidence. Given the similarities between our study and
Bhattacharya et al. (2017), we provide a detailed comparison between
these two studies in appendix Table A1.
Specifically, our study examines (1) the geographic scope of the long-
run impact of unnatural death within and beyond housing estates; (2)
how the market response following unnatural deaths evolves temporally;
and (3) how unnatural deaths resulting from different types of death and
different types of homebuyers lead to different extent of housing market
responses. Aside from these main questions, this study also explores
whether housing price variations are likely caused by the following three
channels: risk awareness, the stigma effect, or the price contagion effect.
The analysis relies on comprehensive data on housing transactions
and unnatural deaths in Hong Kong spanning the period 2001 to 2015.
The data contain detailed information on housing units and location
characteristics as well as households’ characteristics. Linked with pub-
licly released information on the incidence of in-house unnatural deaths,
we are able to explore the housing market outcomes in response to the
occurrence of unnatural deaths from various perspectives. The
geographic scope of the data allows us to explore the extent to which the
impact varies with spatial features captured by residential density. The
long time horizon of the data allows us to explore the temporal pattern of
the market responses over an extended period.
We adopt various specifications in a difference-in-differences setting
that explores both intertemporal and geographic variations in the shock
to identify its impact. One potential threat to the identification of the
causal impact is the endogeneity of the shock. For example, if the death
incidence is more likely to occur in a neighborhood that is deteriorating
over time, the fall of house prices following the shock could reflect the
deviating trend between the treatment and control neighborhoods. We
argue that the occurrence of unnatural deaths is not a consequence of
high-risk individuals sorting into more vulnerable neighborhoods. In
particular, we control for building fixed effects in our empirical analysis
and show that the geographic scope of the impact is contained within a
small cluster of buildings. It is difficult to believe that high-risk in-
dividuals would sort into a particular floor level given the thinness of the
housing market. This is in line with Bayer et al. (2008) in identifying the
peer effect on labor market outcomes.
We obtain the following findings: housing values drop about 25% for
units with deaths, 4.5% for other units on the same floor, 2.6% for other
floor units in the same building, and 1% for units in other buildings of the
same estate. However, the average house price of units in other estates
within 300m increases 0.5%. For units with deaths, the price decline is
sustained across the whole study period. The price impact on units in
other geographic scopes follows a U shape and starts to reverse after 4–5
years of a death. The impact is significantly different by type of death,
and type of homebuyer. Lastly, we explore the mechanism of the price
variation caused by the unnatural death incidence, and find that the
impact is largely from the stigma effect rather than other channels.
The evidence documented in this study contributes to the literature in
a number of ways. First, it quantifies the social impact of a direct and
striking signal of social disturbance—unnatural deaths of local residents.
These incidences cause uneasiness about living in the neighborhood,
especially for those deaths resulting from murder and suicide. Death
incidence leads to spatially concentrated responses but long-lasting
temporal impacts. Given the durable nature of housing, the long-run
supply of housing tends to be perfectly inelastic when facing reduced
demand. In this case, market response generates sharp equilibrium price
drops even after a long time horizon (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). With
proper controls, an accurate measure of the long-run effect is essential for
a better understanding of the aggregate social cost following the occur-
rence of in-house unnatural death.
Second, our findings complement the literature on housing exter-
nalities/spillovers. Housing prices may be affected by nearby properties
through urban revitalization (Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Hornbeck and
Keniston, 2017), cessation of rental control (Autor et al., 2014), crime
risk (Linden and Rockoff, 2008), forced sales (Campbell et al., 2011), and
so forth. The difference between our study and others is that we
emphasize the psychological impact on nearby property value. Although
the role of psychology in affecting the behavior of investors has been well
studied in the past 2 decades, most studies have focused on high-liquid
assets, such as stocks (Shiller, 2003; Thaler, 2006). Even though hous-
ing is one of the most important asset classes, research on psychological
impact on the housing market remains rare. Our study aims to fill the gap
in this field.
Third, this study is related to the literature identifying the hedonic
price function for local (dis)amenities, such as school quality, pollution,
crime, and property taxes, by exploiting a quasi-experimental design
(Black, 1999; Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001; Bui and Mayer, 2003; Chay
and Greenstone, 2005). One major obstacle in identifying such hedonic
prices is that variation in these location-specific features may be corre-
lated with unobservable factors that also affect housing prices. In this
case, the estimated hedonic prices in a simple cross-sectional setting
reflect the impact of both the key feature of interest and other unob-
served factors, which leads to either upward or downward bias. This
study explores a plausible exogenous shock to the housing market in
identifying the impact of unnatural deaths on housing market outcomes
in a difference-in-differences setting. The evidence indicates that this
factor explains a significant variation in housing prices within the
geographic and temporal scope of the shock.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
housing market structure and psychological background in Hong Kong.
Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 4 performs a
number of examinations on the effect of unnatural death incidence on
property values. Section 5 offers a number of robustness checks to verify
our empirical results. Section 6 explores the mechanism of the death
incidence on housing prices. Section 7 concludes.
2. Hong Kong's housing market and psychological background
2.1. Housing market in Hong Kong
Hong Kong was ranked themost expensive housing market from 2011
to 2017 by the annual Demographia International Housing Affordability
Survey.1 These high housing prices are largely determined by the city's
housing supply shortage relative to demand. In 2016, about 7.3 million
people lived within a 1100-square kilometer territory. Geographically,
the city is surrounded by the South China Sea from the east, south, and
west. The north of the city borders Shenzhen, one of the mega cities in
mainland China. As 80% of Hong Kong is mountainous with natural
parks, its developed area accounts for only 24% of the territory, and the
residential land use accounts for about 7% of the land (Planning
Department of Hong Kong, 2016). Moreover, the city's land supply is
driven largely by economic and political considerations rather than
housing market prices (Chiu, 2007). The geographical constraint and
inelastic land supply certainly contribute to the city's expensive housing
(Glaeser et al., 2005; Saiz, 2010).
To protect the interests of low-income residents, the Hong Kong
1 The reports of the annual Demographia International Housing Affordability
Survey can be found in the following link: http://www.demographia.com/dhi.
pdf.
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government established a public housing system in the 1950s. At present,
the public housing system in Hong Kong accommodates more than 2
million local residents, and provides about 50% of the housing stock.
Although most public housing projects are located in suburban districts,
they reduce the development space for private housing and likely crowd
out private development (Sinai and Waldfogel, 2005), which in turn
further drives up private housing prices.
Housing demand in Hong Kong, one of the financial hubs of East Asia,
remains high. As an immigration society, the city accommodates multi-
national residents. In the past decade, the Hong Kong government has
launched various policies to attract high-skilled professionals, investors,
and students from mainland China to work, live, and study in Hong
Kong.2 These new immigrants drive up housing prices, since immigrants
are not eligible for public housing. For example, near 30,000 investors
were approved to receive permanent residency in Hong Kong through the
Capital Investment Entrant Scheme (CIES) from 2003 to 2015, with an
investment of more than 6.5 million HK dollars (HKD) (the threshold was
increased to 10 million HKD in 2010). The vast majority (90%) of in-
vestors are from mainland China. Through the CIES, the Hong Kong
government has raised more than 270 billion HKD (about 35 billion US
dollars) investment, although the immigration scheme was suspended in
2015. Even though there is no empirical study to estimate the impact of
the CIES on Hong Kong's housing price, the capital inflow through the
CIES is likely to push up local housing prices. The housing price index
rose from about 100 in 2007 to more than 300 at the end of 2016.
Given the expensive housing price, households have to make careful
housing decisions. Many empirical studies have shown the relationship
between tangible factors (e.g., housing characteristics, local amenities,
and accessibility) and housing price. Those tangible factors are certainly
important for homebuyers. However, intangible factors are also impor-
tant in Hong Kong's housing market. Although different ethnic groups
live in Hong Kong today, 89% of the population speaks Cantonese (Hong
Kong Census, 2016). Those local residents have a strong belief in Feng
Shui when making housing decisions.
2.2. Psychological background of unnatural deaths in Hong Kong
Superstitious beliefs are rooted in many societies and cultures, and
the concept of an afterlife is a popular one across cultures. In many so-
cieties, death is taboo.3 Influenced by Taoism, traditional Chinese believe
that people who died as a result of violence or unnatural events can
become “ghosts” who can disturb successive occupants through various
means (Poo, 2004). Housing units in which unnatural deaths have
occurred are called “haunted units,” which are regarded as bad Feng
Shui, and are unsuitable for habitation.4
In Hong Kong, Feng Shui is arguably one of the most important
considerations for housing decisions, especially of local residents. Almost
every local household consults a Feng Shui master before purchasing a
house. Although there is no scientific evidence to support Feng Shui
theory, scholars in psychology have pointed out that superstitious be-
lieves are useful coping mechanisms for misfortunate and uncertainty in
life, especially during harsh times (Vyse, 1997; Zhang et al., 2013).
Intangible psychological effects influence a buyer's willingness to pay,
which has certain implications for housing markets. Not surprisingly,
units with good Feng Shui tend to enjoy premium and vice versa.
Non-local housing buyers in Hong Kong are indirectly affected by Feng
Shui culture, because units with bad Feng Shui might be illiquid in the
housing market.
A few empirical studies have estimated the effects of Feng Shui on
property values in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore. These studies
have shown that housing units with good Feng Shui tend to enjoy a price
premium, and vice versa (Chau, 2001; Lin, 2007; Agarwal et al., 2014).
However, most empirical studies in this area have two problems. First,
there is no clear quantitative definition for good or bad Feng Shui. Re-
searchers need to separate the effect of Feng Shui from the tangible
capitalization effect of local amenities/disamenities. For example,
housing units facing a river can be regarded as having good Feng Shui.
However, those units are likely to have a price premium owing to the
capitalization of the good view, even without Feng Shui considerations.
Second, the Feng Shui attributes (regarded as local amenities or dis-
amenities) are likely to be correlated with unobserved factors within the
hedonic pricing framework (Epple, 1987). For example, lucky and un-
lucky building/floor/unit numbers are associated with good/bad Feng
Shui.5 Many buildings in Hong Kong do not have building/floor/unit
numbers ending with 4, which is considered bad luck in Feng Shui. An
effective approach to estimate the causal effect of intangible effects, such
as Feng Shui, on housing values would be to identify an exogenous
change in Feng Shui factors in a neighborhood and its effect on housing
prices.
The study of death incidence on property value provides an oppor-
tunity to examine the intangible psychological effect of personal beliefs
on property values. Unlike other Feng Shui attributes, an unnatural death
is likely to be exogenous to housing units. Although we have not come
across any empirical research to examine the effect of unnatural death on
housing prices, news on unnatural deaths is quite popular among social
media in Hong Kong. Murders and suicides within housing units are more
likely to be reported, and the prices of those haunted units are usually
20–40% lower than the market values of similar ones.
To understand the effect of unnatural death incidence on property
value, we interview two local housing agents in Hong Kong. Generally,
housing units in which unnatural deaths have occurred, such as murder,
suicide, and accidents, are considered haunted, but deaths due to disease
are not considered in the same category. As the housing price is affected
by the degree of violence involved in those deaths, murders and suicides
tend to have larger effects on housing prices than accidents do. House-
holds can acquire related information on haunted units through housing
agents, building managers, and even neighborhood residents. As the in-
formation on haunted units is relatively easy to collect, non-local
households generally do not have an information disadvantage with re-
gard to acquiring haunted unit information compared to local
households.6
3. Data sources and descriptive statistics
Our analysis relies on two main data sources. The first dataset com-
prises housing transaction data from EPRC.ltd, the largest data vendor in
Hong Kong. There are several type of residential properties in EPRC's
dataset, including estates, single buildings, village houses, and public
housing. Estates, as defined by the EPRC, are housing projects comprising
2 Immigration policies and related statistics can be found through the annual
reports of immigration department of Hong Kong: http://www.immd.gov.hk/
eng/press/press-publications.html. Chang (2017) documents the impact of
mainland Chinese students on neighborhood rental price in Hong Kong.
3 In many Western countries, unnatural deaths also affect housing choice.
Bhattacharya et al. (2017) provide a good overview on this.
4 Feng Shui is an ancient Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing human
beings with their living environments; the theory was widely used for site se-
lection and building design by ancient Chinese (Bruun, 2008).
5 In China, 6 and 8 are considered lucky numbers, as they are homophonic to
luck and prosperity. The number 4 is pronounced in the same way as “dead” in
Chinese and is considered an unlucky number.
6 There is no law requiring agents to disclose unnatural death cases to
homebuyers. However, there is a legal precedent to do so after a housing agent
was penalized by a court in order to compensate for all the losses of the
homebuyer after hiding information on unnatural death. Thus, the incentive for
strategic lying by agents is relatively low (see https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/
common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS¼43673&QS¼%
2B&TP¼JU).
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at least two building towers. Single buildings are smaller in terms of scale
and number of units than estates are. Estates and single buildings are the
main components of Hong Kong's private housing market. There are
around 970 estates and 30,000 single buildings recorded by the EPRC,
but the estates cover about two-thirds of private housing transactions.
The village houses are small-scale properties built by farmers in suburban
areas with generally 2–3 floors. Compared to private housing units,
public housing units that are sold have to satisfy various government
regulations, in which case the transaction price cannot be purely market
driven.
Our study focuses only on housing transactions within estates, which
are the most liquid property in Hong Kong's private housing market. The
EPRC data report detailed the unit address (street, property name, floor,
and unit number), transaction price and date, gross floor area (GFA),
orientation, number of living rooms and bedrooms, and name of home-
buyer. We classify homebuyers into three categories: local buyers, firms,
and others.7 To control for inflation, we convert the nominal sale price
into a real price measured based on the price level in December 2015. We
drop observations without variables for price, unit size, and floor num-
ber, and those with sales price and unit size (GFA) below 1% or above
99% of those levels in the data.
The data on the incidence of unnatural death are mainly from two
public websites and one private real estate consulting firm.8 These
websites have more than 8000 death records in total, covering all type of
properties (office, commercial, public housing, etc.) from 2001 to 2015.9
The information on each death includes the date, name of estate, and a
brief description. After merging the unnatural death events from the two
public resources and excluding duplicates, we identify 934 unnatural
death cases (excluding disease) in a total of 368 estates. Table 1 sum-
marizes the annual numbers of deaths among Hong Kong's three re-
gions.10 We match the data on unnatural deaths with housing transaction
data from the EPRC. Using GIS software, we identify the spatial distri-
bution of estates in which unnatural deaths occurred in Hong Kong, as
shown in Fig. 1.
One caveat of the data on death incidence is that not all records have
complete information on the specific unit number of a death. All 934
cases can be identified at the estate level, but only 705 cases can be
identified at the building tower level, 418 cases at the floor level, and 250
cases at the unit level, as shown in Table 2.11 Across the groups of inci-
dence reported at these four levels, roughly 2–5% are murder cases,
84–90% are suicides, 7–11% are accidents, and the rest resulted from the
unclassified category. Notice that the deaths from murders are dispro-
portionately more likely to identify housing unit numbers. This could be
due to relatively wide media coverage following the murder case.
Given the nature of the data, we utilize different samples when
exploring different geographic scopes of the market response. When the
focus is on the immediate spillover effects on the closest neighbor(s) on
the same floor, the effect is identified based on the sample with housing
unit number reported. When we extend the analysis to examine the
average impact on other floors, the sample with floor level identified is
utilized. When the geographic scope is further extended to other build-
ings or estates, we use the sample with buildings or estates identified,
respectively. The details of the specification are explain later.
Another important feature of the data is that there are often multiple
shocks imposed on the same building or estate. Table 3 reports the fre-
quency of deaths for a building or an estate by using a sample with death
incidence identified at the building tower level (705 deaths in total).
Column 1 shows that about 46% of the estates in the data have one death,
19% of the estates have two deaths, 16% have three deaths, and 20%
have more than three deaths. Even at a narrower scope, at the building
tower level, 2.5% of the towers in the sample have at least twice the
death shocks during the sample period (Column 2). Columns (3) and (4)
summarize the number of estates and towers beyond the haunted estates
and within 300m of their boundary. We only consider the boundary
estates without any death incidence. The scale of boundary estate is
significantly smaller than the haunted estates. On average, estates in
which deaths have occurred have 10.42 building towers (2814/270),
while boundary estates have 3.28 building towers (637/194).
Finally, Table 4 defines variables and summarizes statistics based on
the geographic scope of housing transactions related to the haunted
units, including haunted units themselves, other units in the same floor,
other floors in the same building, other buildings in the same estates, and
other estates within 300m. Variables include the unit transaction price,
unit characteristics (GFA, unit age, and floor number), several event
dummies, type of death (murder, suicide, and accident), and type of
homebuyers (local, firm, and other).12
4. Estimating the effect of unnatural death on housing values
To identify the impact of unnatural deaths, we follow the literature on
the hedonic method and examine the extent to which this disamenity has
been capitalized in housing values (Rosen, 1974). A typical concern
when interpreting the hedonic coefficient is omitted variable bias. If an
unobserved unit or neighborhood feature is correlated with the variable
of interest, the ordinary least square estimates of the hedonic coefficient
will be biased (Bartik, 1987; Epple, 1987). A large number of studies
have taken various approaches, such as difference-in-differences and
regression discontinuity design, to address omitted variable bias in
uncovering the capitalization rate of school quality, crime, population,
Table 1
Annual numbers of unnatural deaths in Hong Kong,a 2001–2015.
Geographic Regions Hong Kong Island Kowloon New Territories Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2001 14 19 20 53
2002 11 14 20 45
2003 22 20 36 78
2004 15 15 19 49
2005 17 8 20 45
2006 10 9 20 39
2007 11 13 23 47
2008 18 17 32 67
2009 21 10 27 58
2010 18 17 32 67
2011 10 7 17 34
2012 21 12 36 69
2013 32 29 39 100
2014 27 23 46 96
2015 21 17 49 87
Total 268 230 436 934
a This table doesn't include death incidence due to diseases.
7 Local residents in Hong Kong speak Cantonese and use traditional Chinese
characteristics. Mainland Chinese speak Mandarin and use simplified Chinese
characteristics. We can easily identify local buyers based on the names of
homebuyers using programming languages. The names of homebuyers end with
.co or .ltd are classified as firms.
8 The two websites recording the unnatural death incidences are http://www.
property.hk/unlucky/and https://www.squarefoot.com.hk/haunted/. We
signed a confidential agreement not to disclose the company name.
9 Our study starts from 2001, as one of the largest public websites (http://
www.property.hk/unlucy/) was founded in July 2000. Our study ends in
2015, as the data from the private consulting firm end in 2015.
10 Geographically, Hong Kong has three regions: Hong Kong Island and Kow-
loon are the urban areas, and the New Territories is the suburban area.
11 The publicly sourced data do not identify the specific unit in which the death
occurred. The identified 250 cases at the unit level are from the private
consulting firm mentioned above.
12 The dataset includes the number of living rooms and bedrooms. As we
control the unit size, we do not add the number of living rooms and bedrooms in
the regression.
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and property taxes (Colwell et al., 2000; Davis, 2004; Figlio and Lucas,
2004; Gibbons, 2004; Linden and Rockoff, 2008). The core idea is to
access the response of property values to an arguably exogenous change
in these location-specific factors.
Similar logic applies when evaluating the impact of unnatural death.
For example, deaths from murder may be more likely to occur in
neighborhoods with high crime risk, and housing in these places tends to
have low values. The incidence of suicide could be negatively correlated
with the wealth status of the family, in which case, the total willingness
to pay for the unit would be low. If this is the case, a simple cross-
sectional comparison of the housing price following the incidence of
death might lead to downward bias of the estimated coefficients. Indeed,
as shown in Table A2, while controlling for neighborhood fixed effects,
regressing the number of unnatural deaths that have occurred in an estate
on the logarithm of the average price per square feet of units within the
estate through a negative binomial regression yields a significantly
negative coefficient of0.683 (Column 1). The corresponding coefficient
is 0.362 if the same number of unnatural deaths is regressed on the
logarithm of transaction price as another proxy of household wealth
status (Column 2). This result implies that there is strong negative cor-
relation between the incidence of unnatural death and other unobserved
neighborhood characteristics.
To address the concerns on omitted variable bias, we adopt a
difference-in-differences strategy by exploiting the cross-sectional and
intertemporal variation in the incidence of death across the entire
housing market in Hong Kong. Table A3 demonstrates the pre-event
parallel price trends among treaded and control groups. The cross-
Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of death incidence in Hong Kong, 2001–2015.
Table 2

















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Murder 17 (1.82%) 17 (2.41%) 16 (3.83%) 14 (5.6%)
Suicide 835 (89.4%) 625 (88.65%) 351 (83.97%) 211 (84.4%)
Accident 70 (7.49%) 53 (7.52%) 46 (11%) 22 (8.8%)
Unclassified 12 (1.28%) 10 (1.42%) 5 (1.2%) 3 (1.2%)
Total 934 705 418 250
Table 3
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Total 270 2814 194 637
a The table reports the numbers of deaths which can be identified at the tower
level. 705 deaths (refer to Table 2) occur within 270 estates and 2814 building
towers.
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sectional and intertemporal variation in the incidence of the unnatural
death allows us to explore the impact while controlling for building fixed
effects and year-by-month fixed effects. Specifically, we adopt the
following specification to implement the identification strategy:
Pit ¼ a0 þ a1Shockst þ a2Xit þ μj þ τt þ εit ; (1)
where Pit is the log total price of unit i transacted at time t. Shockst is a
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the unit is sold after the death
within a geographic scope of s, and otherwise takes a value of 0. Xit is a
vector of unit characteristics, including the natural logarithm of unit size
(GFA), unit age (Age), and floor number (Floor). μj is a building tower
fixed effect to capture specific time-invariant building characteristics,
Table 4
Variable definitions and summary statistics a.
Variable Description Own unitb Other units on the
same floorc
Other floors in the
same buildingd




(1) Mean(SD)g (2) Mean(SD) (3) Mean(SD) (4) Mean(SD) (5) Mean(SD)
Price_Gfa Unit price, HKD/square foot 5374.59(2489.617) 5563.631(2560.697) 5731.26(2700.281) 5459.595(2570.395) 6704.574(3246.555)
Total_Price Total price per unit, HKD million 4.3408(4.1876) 4.1603(3.3557) 4.3608(3.4123) 3.9115(2.8064) 5.2623(4.2757)
GFA Gross floor area, square foot 740.7258(303.4179) 697.7618(249.7702) 716.7722(253.394) 690.549(218.2652) 729.9423(257.3883)
Age Age of unit in years 13.1548(9.561) 13.5061(9.9301) 12.6431(10.1456) 16.6645(9.4153) 11.0539(10.8564)
Floor Floor number 20.8645(11.2031) 21.3512(11.7332) 22.9189(15.0903) 18.5738(12.3725) 18.9705(12.596)
After Binary, 1¼ transaction after the
death incidence, 0 otherwise
0.5419(0.499) 0.4186(0.4935) 0.4436(0.4968) 0.4166(0.493) 0.3457(0.4756)
After_Event Binary, 1¼ transaction after the
death and before the first
transaction of haunted units,
0 otherwise
0 0.2187(0.4135) 0.3077(0.4615) 0.3349(0.472) 0.2904(0.454)
After_Tran Binary, 1¼ transaction after the
first transaction of haunted units,
0 otherwise
0.5419(0.499) 0.1999(0.4) 0.1359(0.3427) 0.0816(0.2738) 0.0553(0.2286)
Murder Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with murder,
0 otherwise
0.0645(0.2461) 0.0595(0.2367) 0.047(0.2116) 0.0226(0.1486) 0.0036(0.0598)
Suicide Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with suicide,
0 otherwise
0.8323(0.3742) 0.8499(0.3572) 0.8221(0.3824) 0.8941(0.3078) 0.9186(0.2734)
Accident Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with accident,
0 otherwise
0.0968(0.2961) 0.0832(0.2763) 0.1218(0.3271) 0.0663(0.2488) 0.0772(0.267)
Local Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with local buyers,
0 otherwise
0.8194(0.3853) 0.8742(0.3317) 0.8621(0.3448) 0.8785(0.3267) 0.8258(0.3793)
Firm Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with firm buyers,
0 otherwise
0.1065(0.3089) 0.0583(0.2344) 0.0651(0.2467) 0.0603(0.238) 0.0708(0.2565)
Other Binary, 1¼ transaction
associated with other buyers,
0 otherwise
0.0742(0.2625) 0.0674(0.2509) 0.0727(0.2597) 0.0612(0.2398) 0.1034(0.3045)
Observation 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a Year and month dummies as well as building tower dummies are not included in the summary statistics.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the unnatural death.
c Other units on the same floor exclude the haunted units.
d Other floors in the same building exclude the floor occurring unnatural death.
e Other buildings in the same estate exclude the towers occurring the unnatural death.
f Other estates within 300m refer boundary estates without any death incidence.
g SD refers standard deviations.
Table 5
Effect of death incidence on housing values by identifiable scope a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After Event 0.2538* 0.0451*** 0.0263*** 0.0111*** 0.0046***
(0.1297) (0.0158) (0.0082) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Unit Characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.9952 0.9787 0.9697 0.9689 0.9755
Observations 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a The table summarizes our baseline results for housing externalities of unnatural death at different identifiable scopes. The dependent variable is the log unit total
price (lnTotal_Price). Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
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and τt is the year-by-month fixed effect. εit is the error term. The standard
errors are clustered at the building tower level.
To explore the geographic scope of the spillover effect, we vary the
index s in a set of regressions to include only the unit itself first, then other
units on the same floor, other floors in the same building, other buildings
in the same estate, and other estates within 300m. The varying magnitude
of the estimated a1 helps us to understand the extent to which the impact
of unnatural death disperses spatially. As shown in Column 1 of Table 5,
units in which unnatural deaths occurred experience a 25% drop in value
following the incidence. Nearby units on the same floor also receive a
significant price drop, of 4.5%, as shown in Column 2. Columns 3–5 show
that the magnitude of the spillover effect drops steadily as the geographic
scope expands across the set of definitions, until it reverses to a positive
impact at the 0.46% level for other estates within 300m. This result
suggests that potential homebuyers might deliberately choose to avoid
estates that have units in which unnatural deaths have occurred, and
instead search for housing in other estates in relatively close proximity.
As indicated earlier, only a small subset of all deaths report the spe-
cific housing unit number in which the incidence occurred. Hence, the
identification of the own-unit impact solely relies on this small sample of
the data (310 transactions with unit numbers identified and that have
received the shock at a certain point in time during the sample period).
The impact of the unnatural death on other units of the same floor is
identified by including other unit transactions on the same floor as the
identified death unit (1646 observations). With regard to identifying the
impact on units on other floors in the same building, we expand the
sample to include deaths that can be identified at the floor level. Doing so
increases the sample size to 92,639 observations. Similarly, Column 4,
which presents the impact on other buildings in the same estate, further
expands the sample to include those deaths that can be identified only at
the building level. Column 5 further includes those deaths that can be
identified only at the estate level.
Next, we delve deeper into the challenge associated with multiple
treatment that occurs in this same set of geographic scopes. Although we
find multiple death incidence at both the tower and estate levels (shown
in Table 3), each death is likely to be independent of one another.
Through the case description on each death, nearly all deaths are due to
social, economic, or psychological reasons rather than poor quality or
maintenance of housing properties. We run simple OLS regressions to
examine the relationship between a dummy on whether a unit with a
death and unit attributes at different levels, and we find that unit attri-
butes do not explain whether a death event occurs. The results are shown
in Appendix Table A4.
The initial set of analysis simply treats each death as an independent
occurrence and estimates an average treatment effect across all deaths.
However, the impact of a sequence of shocks imposed on the same estate
might vary in magnitude. We further specify the model to capture this
multiple treatment effect. Table 6 shows that the effects of death
incidence on other floors in the same building (column 3) tend to in-
crease for estates without multiple shocks on building towers. Table 7
shows that the average effect of death incidence tends to decline as es-
tates receive more death shocks.
Another focus of the study is to explore the temporal scope of the
spillover effect. The idea is that the impact of the shock at the very
beginning is potentially large owing to immediate psychological re-
sponses. However, over time, the impact might be dilutedwhen the death
has been forgotten. A better understanding of the long-term impact of the
incidence is importance for accurately assessing welfare losses following
the death. To capture this temporal pattern, we run a similar set of the
regressions controlling the time lag following the death. Table 8 shows
that the impact is dramatically sustained for units that have received a
death shock. The drop in price started immediately following the shock,
but persisted even many years after the incidence. For units in other
scopes, the price evolution takes a U shape, and the price continuously
declines for 4–5 years.
Next, we explore the heterogeneity of the effect of death incidence by
type of death and type of homebuyer. As documented in the previous
section, the effect of death incidence on housing price might vary by the
Table 6
Effect of death incidence on housing values without multiple shocks at the tower level a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After Event 0.2396 0.0587*** 0.0418*** 0.0121*** 0.0058***
(0.1749) (0.0197) (0.0109) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Unit Characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.996 0.9785 0.9685 0.9638 0.9755
Observations 242 1255 68866 1691872 654280
a The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
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a This table summarizes the results of three regressions based on the number of
unnatural deaths within estates. The dependent variable is the log unit total price
(lnTotal_Price). Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level. All
regressions control the unit characteristics, tower fixed effects and time fixed
effects.
b We don't run the unit effect as the sample size is relatively small in each
regression.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers
receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
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degree of violence involved. We should observe a large price decline due
to deaths with deep psychological impact. Table 9 reports those results.
We find that the impact is strongest for murder cases and is not present
for accidents. Suicides seem to have the strongest spillover impact to the
neighborhood. There may be concern that murder and suicide cases are
well reported on social media, which can affect the price variation.
However, wide media coverage can be regarded as evidence of deep
psychological impact of murders and suicides.
Lastly, we examine the price variation by type of homebuyer.
Different groups of buyers may have different levels of psychological
recognition with respect to Feng Shui beliefs. Table 10 shows that local
buyers are the most sensitive group to death incidence. Investment firms
are also quite sensitive to the negative shocks of death incidence, espe-
cially for units within the same building towers. However, for other non-
local buyers, including mainland Chinese homebuyers, the impact of
death incidence on property values is relatively small, except for units in
which the death shocks occurred.13 As the sorting mechanism may exist
for less superstitious buyers, these buyers sort into buying “haunted”
units or live close to them. Given this, we estimate the upper envelope of
the bidding functions of all types of buyers. The price differentials among
all these buyers in the study refer to the possibility of the stigma effects
triggered by the superstitious belief. In other words, because superstition
matters in bidding for the “haunted” housing units, those holding
stronger beliefs sort away from these units. This behavior generates a
lower price for the haunted units in the hedonic regression (upper en-
velope of the bidding functions).
5. Robustness checks
As we can only identify 250 death incidences at the unit level,
concern may arise about the difference between the 250 cases and other
death incidences that cannot be identified at the unit level. In this sec-
tion, we present three further robustness checks. The first one is the
regression on housing estates corresponding to those 250 death in-
cidences, and the results are shown in Table 11.
We find similar housing externalities in the different geographic
scopes when we focus on estates in which the death incidence can be
identified at the unit level. This finding indicates that other estates with
death incidence identified at tower and estate levels share similar
housing externalities within and across housing estates. Another concern
is that the current unit- and floor-level estimation could be over-
estimated, since nearly all murder cases can be identified at the unit level.
We run another regression by excluding murder cases, and the results are
shown in Table 12.
The results show that the unit and floor effects are slightly lower than
in the full sample regression, but the effects on other spatial scopes are
nearly identical. Again, the overall patterns of spatial decay remain the
same. Lastly, we add back disease cases as a robustness check. There are
140 disease cases, but most of them can be identified only at the building
and estate levels. The results are shown in Table 13.
After including the disease cases, the results for different types of
death are nearly identical to those estimated before. However, all co-
efficients on the disease are relatively small and insignificant. This result
Table 8
Temporal effect of death incidence on housing values a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After1 Event 0.3117** 0.0324* 0.013** 0.0054*** 0.01***
(0.1341) (0.0171) (0.0064) (0.0008) (0.0017)
After2 Event 0.2153 0.0491*** 0.0235*** 0.0134*** 0.0093***
(0.251) (0.0183) (0.0081) (0.0009) (0.0019)
After3 Event 0.2466 0.0251 0.0305*** 0.0207*** 0.0056**
(0.182) (0.0222) (0.0099) (0.0012) (0.0027)
After4 Event 0.1935 0.0538** 0.0306*** 0.0216*** 0.0007
(0.1797) (0.0238) (0.0107) (0.0013) (0.0022)
After5 Event 0.3118 0.0588** 0.0235** 0.0164*** 0.0003
(0.2405) (0.0249) (0.0119) (0.0013) (0.0024)
After6 Event 0.2952 0.0563** 0.0211 0.0111*** 0.0008
(0.2291) (0.0265) (0.0129) (0.0011) (0.0026)
After7 Event – 0.0521* 0.0161 0.0025** 0.0005
– (0.0268) (0.0135) (0.0011) (0.0032)
After8 Event – 0.0344 0.0112 0.0044*** 0.003
– (0.031) (0.0139) (0.001) (0.003)
After9 Event – 0.0387 0.0035 0.0102*** (0.0047)
– (0.0345) (0.0147) (0.0012) (0.0043)
After¼>10 Event – 0.0188 (0.0091) 0.0099*** 0.0004
– (0.0351) 0.0172 (0.0017) (0.004)
Unit characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.9956 0.9788 0.9699 0.9691 0.9762
Observations 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a The table shows the results of temporal effect of death incidence on different identifiable scopes. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price).
Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence. As we don't have enough samples to capture all temporal variations after controlling the tower and time fixed
effects, our estimation stops at year 6 (After¼>6) at the unit level, while other scopes stop at year 10 (After¼>10).
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
13 We run an F-test to examine whether the coefficients between local buyers
and other buyers are different. The F-test is very significant from columns (2) to
(4), indicating that other buyers are not sensitive to the housing externalities of
unnatural death. However, at the unit level (the first column), the F-test is
significant only at 13%, and therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
other buyers also care about unnatural death if they live in the haunted units.
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is consistent with the view that disease does not account for haunted
housing, and the negative effect on nearby units should be small.
6. Mechanism of death incidence on housing price
Section 4 shows the housing externalities of the unnatural death
incidence, and it seems that the stigma effect is likely to be the main
channel of housing externalities. This section further explores the price
mechanism of death shocks by ruling out other channels: the crime risk
effect and price contagion effect.
Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) both documented the
crime risk of sexual offenders on housing values. Households have less
willingness to pay for units closer to sexual offenders, because these
households are concerned about crime risk. Our study involves certain
type of crimes (2% murder and 90% suicide), but both have very
different natures to the sexual offender type. Sexual offenders can
conduct their crimes multiple times, but both murders and suicides are
one-time events, as criminals are either die or are sent to jail. In addition,
suicide is a personal action, and usually presents no direct harm or threat
to other households.
The previous section (Table 2A) shows that households living in a poor
neighborhood are more likely to experience deaths. This risk is likely to be
the result of poverty or other social and economic reasons, and is not at all
related to death incidence per se. In another words, one death does not
trigger or increase the possibility of another death in the same estates.
Deaths within the same neighborhood should be independent of each
other. Intuitively, after controlling for household income level, the num-
ber of deaths across estates should largely depend on the scale of estates.
We should observe more deaths in large-scale estates, which can be
indicated by the number of units, average unit size (GFA), and time on the
market (building age). As deaths are a rare event (relative to number of
households), we apply a Poisson model to examine the relationship be-
tween the numbers of unnatural deaths and estate scales. Table A5 gives
the variable definitions and summarizes the statistics for the following
Poisson regression. All the independent variables use log form, and thus,
the coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity. The regression controls the
neighborhood fixed effect and standard deviations are clustered by
neighborhoods. The results are summarized in Table 14.
Table 9
Effect of death incidence on housing values by type of deaths a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within
300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After EventMurder 0.6083*** 0.1066* 0.0514 0.0009 0.0057
(0.1833) (0.0638) (0.0373) (0.0044) (0.0038)
After Event Suicide 0.2406* 0.0419** 0.0259*** 0.0114*** 0.0048***
(0.127) (0.0167) (0.0087) (0.0008) (0.0012)
After EventAccident 0.1107 0.0371 0.0121 0.0068*** 0.002
(0.2111) (0.0268) (0.0216) (0.0023) (0.0031)
Unit characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.9959 0.9788 0.9698 0.9689 0.9755
Observations 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a The table shows the results of death incidence by type of deaths. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). The three main independent
variables are the type of death interacted with time and event dummies. We don't include the unclassified type of death in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at
the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
Table 10
Effect of death incidence on housing values by type of homebuyers a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After Event Locals 0.261** 0.0465*** 0.0288*** 0.0125*** 0.0005
(0.1292) (0.0162) (0.0082) (0.0008) (0.0012)
After Event Firms 0.3079 0.0723*** 0.0181* 0.0024 0.0284***
(0.2196) (0.0275) (0.0095) (0.002) (0.0034)
After EventOthers 0.2284 0.0153 0.0062 0.0005 0.0206***
(0.1641) (0.0215) (0.0092) (0.0015) (0.0034)
Unit characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.9952 0.9788 0.9698 0.969 0.9755
Observations 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a The table shows the results of death incidence by type of homebuyers. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). The three main independent
variables are the type of homebuyers interacted with time and event dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
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Table 11
Effects within estates covering 250 identified unit death shocks a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After Event 0.2538* 0.0451*** 0.0188*** 0.0111*** 0.0028**
(0.1297) (0.0158) (0.0071) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Unit Characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.9952 0.9787 0.9704 0.9696 0.9778
Observations 310 1646 79772 1956788 555875
a The table shows the results of death incidence within estates, where haunted units occur. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). Standard
errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
Table 12
Effect of death incidence on housing values without murder cases a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After Event 0.2228* 0.0404** 0.0238*** 0.0111*** 0.0046***
(0.1254) (0.0159) (0.0083) (0.0007) (0.0012)
Unit Characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.9959 0.9788 0.9691 0.9688 0.9755
Observations 290 1548 88286 2146385 797883
a The table shows the results of death incidence on housing values by excluding the murder cases. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price).
Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
Table 13
Effect of death incidence on housing values including disease a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same
Floorc
Other floors in the same
buildingd




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After EventMurder 0.6083*** 0.1056* 0.0514 0.0005 0.0057
(0.1839) (0.0636) (0.0373) (0.0042) (0.0041)
After Event Suicide 0.2406* 0.0419** 0.0259*** 0.0113*** 0.005***
(0.1274) (0.0166) (0.0087) (0.0008) (0.0012)
After EventAccident 0.1107
(0.2118)
0.0367 (0.0268) 0.0119 (0.0216) 0.0071*** (0.0023) 0.0043 (0.0028)
After EventDisease 0.0257 0.0354 0.0106 0.0028 0.0013
(0.7384) (0.0525) (0.0112) (0.0022) (0.0017)
Unit characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.996 0.979 0.97 0.9694 0.9767
Observations 312 1655 94682 2454027 956761
a The table shows the results of death incidence by type of deaths including 140 disease cases. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). We
don't include the unclassified type of death in the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
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Columns (1)–(3) report the elasticity of the number of deaths and
scale of estates. We find that the elasticities of the number of deaths with
respect to the number of units and age of estates are both close to 1, and
the results are very robust. The coefficient on the average unit size of
estate is also positive, although not significant. In columns (4) and (5), we
add the log(price) and log(total price) to indicate the average housing
value and household wealth level, respectively. Both coefficients are
negative, although not significant. Table 14 also reports the deviance of
goodness-of-fit and all models appear to be a perfect fit to Poisson
regression. One assumption of the Poisson model is that each event is
independent given the same interval of time. The regression results seem
to support that death incidences within a neighborhood are independent,
and thus, we can largely rule out the crime risk perception channel.
Next, we explore whether the price effect by death incidence is trig-
gered through the price contagion channel, as the haunted units are sold
with an average discount of 25%. This channel is highlighted by Camp-
bell et al. (2011), who estimated the housing price externalities caused
by foreclosure sale in the state of Massachusetts in the United States. On
average, foreclosure units experience a price drop of 27%, and the
housing price for units within 0.05 miles also declines 1%. In our study,
units with deaths have the largest and most sustained price drop. If the
prices of other units are affected through the channel of price contagion,
we should observe a significant price decline after the first transaction of
haunted units. To examine the effect of price contagion, we create two
new dummies: event dummy (after_event) and transaction dummy
(after_tran) to separate the effects of death incidence and the first sale of
haunted units. The regression results are reported in Table 15.
We find that all coefficients on the event dummies are very signifi-
cant, indicating that other units are significantly affected by a death. By
comparison, the coefficients on the transaction dummy are relatively
small and not significant, except for other buildings in the same estate
shown in column (4). However, Table 8 (column 4) shows that price
tends to decline for 4 years after the death. As the first transaction of
haunted units occurs 2.63 years after the death on average, the results
shown in column (4) cannot provide much evidence to support the price
contagion channel. Instead, the result demonstrates that the stigma effect
is the main channel for the housing externalities.
7. Conclusion
In-house unnatural deaths are a common phenomenon within
neighborhoods. In Hong Kong, nearly 6000 unnatural deaths were re-
ported from 2001 to 2015.14 This study documents the impact of un-
natural death incidence on housing values. Using various difference-in-
differences analyses, we find that haunted units lost more than 25% in
value over a 15-year time window (2001–2015). Other units are also
affected, but the magnitude depends on the geographic scope. The price
evolution of other affected units appears to be U shaped, and the price
starts to reverse 4–5 years after a death. Furthermore, the effect of death
impact varies by type of death, and type of homebuyer. We confirm that
the housing externalities of unnatural death incidence are mainly
through the stigma effect, rather than other channels.
Our study complements the existing literature on housing external-
ities with several distinct features. First, we aid understanding of the role
of psychology on housing values. Although many studies emphasize the
role of psychological/behavior impact on asset values, most of these
studies focus on highly liquid assets, such as stocks. Even though housing
is one of the most important asset classes, research on the impact of
psychological/behavior on the housing market is still limited. Our study
finds that psychological recognition through cultural beliefs has a pro-
found impact on neighborhood values. Second, our examination focuses
on long-term effects, rather than short-term horizons of 1–2 years. As
housing prices in other units continuously decline for 4–5 years, the
short-term estimation is unlikely to be accurate. Table A6 summarizes the
difference-in-differences results by employing different time windows,
and confirms that short-term estimation underestimates the price decline
and welfare losses. Third, our study performs multiple dimensional ex-
aminations to understand the effect of death incidence on neighborhood
values through spatial, temporal, and heterogeneous analysis, thereby
helping to understand the stigma effect of death incidence on housing
values from broader perspectives.
The implications of this study should not be limited to Hong Kong and
other Chinese societies where Feng Shui culture is prevalent. In fact,
Table 14
Numbers of deaths with respect to the scale of estates a.
Dependent Variable Count numbers Count numbers Count numbers Count numbers Count numbers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(number of units in each estate)b 0.9919*** 1.0017*** 0.996*** 1.002*** 1.0014***
(0.0487) (0.0452) (0.0499) (0.0481) (0.0482)
Log(age of estate)c – 0.9198*** 0.9967*** 0.9284*** 0.9339***
– (0.1126) (0.1361) (0.1966) (0.1986)
Log(average unit size in each estate)d – – 0.3142 0.3651 0.5702
– – (0.2463) (0.246) (0.4935)
Log(average unit price/sf in each estate)e – – – 0.2361 –
– – – (0.3887) –
Log(average total unit price in each estate)f – – – – 0.2092
– – – – (0.384)
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.5137 0.5417 0.5402 0.5404 0.5404
Observation 973 959 834 834 834
Deviance goodness-of-fit 801.197 688.8493 614.5643 613.9971 614.1031
Prob> chi2g 0.9013 1 0.9951 0.9987 0.9987
a The table shows the results of Poisson regressions to illustrate the relationship between the number of deaths within each estate and the scale of estate. The
dependent variable is count number of death incidence within each estate. The independent variables include number of unit, age and average unit size of estate, in
which can indicate the scale of estate.
b The number of units in each estate is from the Centaline Property, which is one of the largest housing vendor in Hong Kong.
c The age of estate is accounted by the year of 2015 (2015 – construction year). The construction year of each estate is from the Centaline Property.
d The average unit size of each estate is accounted based on the transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
e The average price of each estate is accounted based on the price of transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
f The average unit total price of each estate is accounted based on the unit total price of transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
g The Prob> chi2 demonstrates a perfect fit for the Poisson regression.
14 The two public websites report more than 8000 unnatural death incidences
from 2001 to 2015, but there are many duplicates.
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death is a taboo subject in many societies, including many Western
countries, such as the US and UK (Walter, 1991), and death incidence is
likely to affect a household's willingness to pay for housing in many place
around the world. As in-house unnatural death incidence is not an un-
common phenomenon (compared to crime), its impact on housing values
should not be neglected. More broadly, our study illustrates the impor-
tance of psychological/behavioral impact on housing price of tradition
and cultural beliefs. We hope that further research can reveal the phys-
iological/behavioral effects on households' willingness to pay in housing
markets, which would certainly deepen our understanding of housing
externalities and asset pricing.
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Appendix
At the revise and resubmit stage of this paper, we came to know a paper by Bhattacharya et al. (2017) that studies a similar question in the same
setting. Despite variations in sample size and measures taken to account for the geographic and temporal scope, we obtained similar main results. The
consistency reassures the replicability of our main findings. To further mark the differences between our paper and Bhattacharya et al. (2017), we show
a detailed comparison in Table A1.
Table A1
Comparison of our paper with Bhattacharya's paper.
This Paper Bhattacharya et al. (2017)
Data Source (1)Housing
Transaction Data
974 estates 214 out of 7352 estates (2.9%)
(2)Haunted
Housing Data
2 public websites (http://www.property.hk/unlucky/https://
www.squarefoot.com.hk/haunted/) and information provided
by a private consulting firm
4 public websites (http://www.property.hk/unlucky/https://www.
squarefoot.com.hk/haunted/, www.hk-compass.com/badfile.php, www.
spacious.hk/en/hong-hong/resources/tragic-events)
(3)Sample period From 2001 to 2015 From 2000 to 2015
(4)# of Death Event 934 unnatural death with 250 cases with specific housing units
identified
898 unnatural death with 165 cases with specific housing units identified
Empirical
Analysis
(5) Time scope Long run effect Short run effect
(6) Spatial Scope Housing Externalities Units beyond the same estate Asset Pricing Units within the same estate




(9) Heterogeneous Death type and buyer type Death type
(10) Mechanism Stigma, Crime Risk, Price Contagion Quality versus Firesale
Specifically, we highlight the difference between these two papers in two broad aspects: data and empirical analysis. Related to data, we found four
major differences:
First, the transaction data employed in both exercises come from the same source, EPRC.ltd, the largest data vendor in Hong Kong. From this data,
we have obtained 974 estates for our analysis. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) indicated that they chose 214 estates out of 7352 estates in total –only large
estates with more than 1000 units. Based on a follow-up call with EPRC.ltd, our sample of 974 estates is more consistent with EPRC's records. We didn't
restrict our sample to large estate.
Second, data on the incidence of unnatural death come from partially different sources for these two papers. Our data come from two public
websites1 and one private real estate consulting firm.2 The public websites complement each other in providing the information related to in-house
death in Hong Kong.3 However, the public sourced data do not identify the specific unit in which the death occurred – 75% identified at the tower
Table 15
Stigma effect VS price contagion a.
Identifiable Scope Own unitb Other units on the same Floorc Other floors in the same buildingd Other buildings in the same estatee Other estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
After _Event – 0.0566*** 0.0289*** 0.0119*** 0.0052***
– (0.0164) (0.0081) (0.0008) (0.0012)
After_Transaction 0.2538* 0.0171 0.0168 0.0072*** 0.0013
(0.1297) (0.02) (0.012) (0.0011) (0.003)
Unit characteristicsg YES YES YES YES YES
Tower fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
R squared 0.9952 0.9789 0.9698 0.9689 0.9755
Observations 310 1646 92639 2195966 800757
a The table shows the results of stigma effect vs price contagion. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). The two main independent variables
are explained in Table 4. Standard errors are clustered at the building tower level.
b Own unit refers the unit receiving the death incidence.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
g Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
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level and 45% identified at the floor level. The data obtained from the private consulting firm provides a few additional records of deaths but largely
agree with the general information provided in the two public websites. More importantly, it helps to identify 250 units in which the death occurred.
This detailed information allows us to separately identify the impact on the unit itself and other nearby units on the same floor. The data in Bhattacharya
et al. (2017) are from four public websites. Two overlaps with our sources and the other two are www.hk-compass.com/badfile.php and www.spacious.
hk/en/hong-hong/resources/tragic-events. We have double checked and confirmed that information provided in these two additional sites won't
improve the number of identified units based on what has already been captured in our public and private combined dataset.
Third, the sample period and total number of observations are slightly different. Our final sample is from 2001 to 2015. It starts from 2001 as one of
the largest public website (http://www.property.hk/unlucky/) was founded in July 2000 and records in the initial fewmonths seem not very complete.
It ends in 2015 as the data from the private consulting firm end in 2015. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) use data from 2000 to 2015. Given that the
Bhattacharya et al. (2017) select on large estates while we use all identified estates, we have larger number of observations even with a sample period
that is one year less than that in Bhattacharya et al. (2017).
Fourth, Bhattacharya et al. (2017) has identified 898 unnatural death in total and 165 cases with specific housing units identified. We have identified
934 unnatural death with 250 cases with unit identified. This information on the specific death unit is from the private consulting firm mentioned
above. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) didn't reveal the source of the information for the 165 unit identified cases in their most recent version. (This in-
formation is not provided in the public websites indicated in the paper).
Related to empirical analysis, we summarize the differences from six perspectives. First, we focus on the long run impact of the unnatural death since
the negative shocks could have long term impact on housing values given the asymmetric nature of real properties (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005).
Bhattacharya et al. (2017) largely measures the short run effect.
Second, we examines a broader geographic scope of the impact of unnatural death. We separate the impact into own unit effect, impact on nearby
units on the same floor, impact on units on other floors of the same building, impact on units in other buildings of the same estate, and impact on units
outside the estate but within 300m radius. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) has focused on the effect within the estates, without extending the analysis to
other nearby estates.
Third, we examine the temporal pattern of the impact for an extended period of time.
Fourth, there are cases with multiple death treatment within an estate. We have separately identified these estates and find the marginal impact of
unnatural death tends to decline as more shock within the sample building and the same estates occurs (see Tables 6 and 7). Bhattacharya et al. (2017)
didn't take this into consideration when designing their empirical specifications.
Fifth, we consider heterogeneity along two dimensions: death type and buyer type. Bhattacharya et al. (2017) considers only death type.
Lastly, we consider three channels through which the impact may come to play: the stigma effect, potential crime risk, and the price contagion effect.
Bhattacharya et al. (2017) approaches the question from ther perspective of quality channel versus fire sale effect.
Table A2
Numbers of deaths and average housing price of estates a.
Dependent Variable Count numbers Count numbers
(1) (2)
log(average price per square foot)b 0.6834** (0.2873)
log(average total unit price)c 0.362* (0.1879)
Neighborhood fixed effect YES YES
Pseudo R2 0.1762 0.1769
Observation 834 834
a The table shows the results of negative binomial regressions to illustrate the relationship between the
number of deaths and the average housing price of estate. The dependent variable is count number of death
incidence within each estate. As many estates don't have transaction price information, the number of
estates is 834 in this table. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b The average price of each estate is accounted based on the price of transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
c The average unit total price of each estate is accounted based on the unit total price of transacted units
from 2001 to 2015.
Table A3
The pre-trend examination between treated and other control groupsa.
Identifiable Scope Tower - Linear Tower -Quadratic Tower - Cubic Estate -Linear Estate - Quadratic Estate - Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Linear time trend death dummy 3.33e-06 8.1e-04** 2.4e-04 7.25e-06 6.6e-04* 2.3e-04
(0.0001) (3.5e-04) (5.6e-04) （9.65e-05） (3.4e-04) (5.6e-04)
Quadratic time trend death dummy – 5.15e-06*** 3.4e-06 – 4.27e-06** 9.08e-06
– (1.91e-06) (6.84e-06) – (1.88e-06) (6.81e-06)
Cubic time trend death dummy – – 3.43e-08 – – 5.35e-08**
– – (2.56e-08) – – (2.53e-08)
Unit Characteristicsb YES YES YES YES YES YES
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.9695 0.9696 0.9696 0.9716 0.9716 0.9716
Observations 331515 331515 331515 382237 382237 382237
a The table shows the pre-trend examination between treated and control groups at tower and estate levels. We thank for the suggestion form a referee for the
following steps: first, drop observations once a death occur at the tower level. Second, randomly drop observations from no death towers in equal shares to the death
tower each period (in the same year and month) to keep the composition of the two samples the same. Third, interact a time trend (linear, quadratic, and cubic) with the
dummy for the death sample. Again, the dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). The main independent variable is the interaction term (time trend x
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death event). We find all coefficients are all close to 0, although the quadratic regression in column (2) and (4) are significant. Standard errors are clustered at the
building tower level.
b Unit characteristics include log(GFA), log(Age), and log(Floor).
Table A4
Unit attributes and death incidence a.
Identifiable Scope Units on the same floor Units in the same building Units in the same estate Units in the estate and beyond
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (Gfa) 0.0548 0.0007 8.6e-05 7.1e-05
(0.0999) (0.0021) (2.6–04) (2.2e-04)
log(Floor) – 0.0007 8.9e-05 7.7e-05
– (0.0005) (5.8e-05) (5e-05)
log(Age of Estate) b – – 1.7e-05 1e-05
– – (2.9e-04) (2.4e-04)
Tower Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES
R Squared 0.0965 0.0045 0.0085 0.0086
Observations 1060 34563 292814 346103
a The table shows the OLS regression results to demonstrate the relationship between the unit attributes and whether a unit receives a death at different levels by
controlling the building tower fixed effect. The dependent variable is the dummy on whether a unit has a death or not. Independent variables are major unit attributes.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
b The age of estate is accounted by the year of 2015 (2015 – construction year).
Table A5
Variable definitions and summary statistics for Poisson regression a.
Description Observations Mean SD
Unitb Number of units in each estate 973 743.26 1340.48
Agec Age of estate (Year) 974 25.66 12.75
Gfad Average gross floor area of units (sqft) 834 993.7 648.02
Price/sfe Average price per sqft of units (HKD per sqft) 834 6754.56 3933.971
Total_Pricef Average total unit price (HKD million) 834 8.32 10.88
a The table summarizes variables for Poisson regression. SD refers to standard deviation.
b The number of units in each estate is from the Centaline Property, which is one of the largest housing vendor in Hong Kong.
c The age of estate is accounted by the year of 2015 (2015 – construction year). The construction year of each estate is from the Centaline Property.
d The average unit size of each estate is accounted based on the transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
e The average price of each estate is accounted based on the price of transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
f The average unit total price of each estate is accounted based on the unit total price of transacted units from 2001 to 2015.
Table A6
Effect of death incidence on housing values by different time windows a.
Identifiable Scopeb Other Units on the Same Floorc Other Floors in the Same Buildingd Other Buildings in the Same Estatee Other Estates within 300mf
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 year DID – 0.0002 0.0037*** 0.0078***
– (0.0039) (0.0007) (0.0019)
2 years DID 0.0115 0.0064 0.0082*** 0.0052***
(0.0332) (0.0059) (0.0009) (0.0019)
3 years DID 0.0431* 0.0147** 0.0145*** 0.0058***
(0.0261) (0.0065) (0.0011) (0.002)
Full year DID 0.0451*** 0.0263*** 0.0111*** 0.0046***
(0.0158) (0.0082) (0.0007) (0.0012)
a This table summarizes the results of four regressions based on the different time windows. The dependent variable is the log unit total price (lnTotal_Price). Standard
errors are clustered at the building tower level. All regressions control the unit characteristics, tower fixed effects and time fixed effects.
b We don't run the unit effect as the sample size is relatively small in each regression.
c The floor effect regression excludes haunted units. We don't have enough samples to run the regression within 1 year time window on the floor level.
d The building effect regression excludes floors receiving death incidence.
e The externalities within the same estates exclude the building towers receiving death incidence.
f The boundary estates don't have any death incidence.
References
Agarwal, S., He, J., Liu, H.M., Png, I.P.L., Sing, T.F., Wong, W.K., 2014. Superstition and
Asset Markets: Evidence from Singapore Housing. Working paper. https://courses.
nus.edu.sg/course/ecswong/workingpapers/pdf/superstition2014.pdf.
Autor, D.H., Palmer, C.J., Pathak, P.A., 2014. Housing market spillovers: evidence from
the end of rent control in Cambridge, Massachusetts. J. Polit. Econ. 122 (3), 661–717.
Bartik, T.J., 1987. The estimation of demand parameters in hedonic price models. J. Polit.
Econ. 95 (1), 81–88.
Bayer, P., Ross, S.L., Topa, G., 2008. Place of work and place of residence: informal hiring
networks and labor market outcomes. J. Polit. Econ. 116 (6), 1150–1196.
Bhattacharya, U., Huang, D., Nielsen, K.M., 2017. Spillovers in Asset Prices: the Curious
Case of Haunted Houses. SSRN working paper. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id¼3077951. (Accessed 16 June 2018).
Black, S.E., 1999. Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education.
Q. J. Econ. 114 (2), 577–599.
Bruun, O., 2008. An Introduction to Feng Shui. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Z. Chang, J. Li Regional Science and Urban Economics 73 (2018) 112–126
125
Bui, T.M., Mayer, C.J., 2003. Regulation and capitalization of environmental amenities:
evidence from the toxic release inventory in Massachusetts. Rev. Econ. Stat. 85 (3),
693–708.
Campbell, J.Y., Giglio, S., Pathak, P., 2011. Forced sales and house prices. Am. Econ. Rev.
101 (5), 2108–2131.
Chang, Z., 2017. Non-local students, housing demand and rental impact: evidence from
mainland students in Hong Kong. Int. Real Estate Rev. 20 (4), 525–548.
Chau, K.W., 2001. The pricing of ‘luckiness’ in the apartment market. J. R. Estate Lit. 9
(1), 29–40.
Chay, K.Y., Greenstone, M., 2005. Does air quality matter? Evidence from the housing
market. J. Polit. Econ. 113 (2), 376–424.
Chiu, L.H., 2007. Planning, land and affordable housing in Hong Kong. Hous. Stud. 22 (1),
63–81.
Colwell, P.F., Dehring, C.A., Lash, N.A., 2000. The effect of group homes on neighborhood
property values. Land Econ. 76 (4), 615–637.
Congdon-Hohman, J.M., 2013. The lasting effects of crime: the relationship of discovered
methamphetamine laboratories and home values. J. Regional Sci. Urban Econ. 43 (1),
31–41.
Davis, L.W., 2004. The effect of health risk on housing values: evidence from a cancer
cluster. Am. Econ. Rev. 94 (5), 1693–1704.
Dealy, B.C., Horn, B.R., Berrens, R.P., 2017. The impact of clandestine methamphetamine
labs on property values: discovery, decontamination and stigma. J. Urban Econ. 99,
161–172.
Epple, D., 1987. Hedonic prices and implicit markets: estimating demand and supply
functions for differentiated products. J. Polit. Econ. 95 (1), 59–80.
Figlio, D.N., Lucas, M.E., 2004. What's in a grade? School report cards and the housing
market. Am. Econ. Rev. 94 (3), 591–604.
Gibbons, S., 2004. The costs of urban property crime. Econ. J. 114 (499), 441–463.
Glaeser, E.L., Gyourko, J., 2005. Urban decline and durable housing. J. Polit. Econ. 113
(2), 345–375.
Glaeser, E.L., Gyourko, J., Saks, R., 2005. Why have housing prices gone up? Am. Econ.
Rev. 95 (2), 329–333.
Hong Kong Census, 2016. Summary Results of 2016 Population By-census. http://www.
bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/index.html. (Accessed 3 April 2017).
Hornbeck, R., Keniston, D., 2017. Creative destruction: barriers to urban growth and the
great Boston Fire of 1872. Am. Econ. Rev. 107 (6), 1365–1398.
Lin, C.M., 2007. A study on the impact of Feng-Shui on the housing price. Q. J. Land Issue
Studies 6 (1), 45–52.
Linden, L., Rockoff, J.E., 2008. Estimates of the impact of crime risk on property values
from Megan's Laws. Am. Econ. Rev. 98 (3), 1103–1127.
Lynch, A.K., Rasmussen, D.W., 2001. Measuring the impact of crime on house prices.
Appl. Econ. 33 (15), 1981–1989.
Planning Department of Hong Kong, 2016. Land Utilization in Hong Kong 2016. http://
www.pland.gov.hk/pland_sc/info_serv/statistic/landu.html (Accessed April 5, 2017).
Poo, M.C., 2004. Religion and Chinese Society: the Concept of Ghosts in Ancient Chinese
Religion. Chinese University Press, Hong Kong (In Chinese).
Pope, J.C., 2008. Fear of crime and housing prices: household reactions to sex offender
registries. J. Urban Econ. 64, 601–614.
Rosen, S., 1974. Hedonic prices and implicit markets: product differentiation in pure
competition. J. Polit. Econ. 82 (1), 34–55.
Rossi-Hansberg, E., Sarte, P.D., Ownes III, R., 2010. Housing externalities. J. Polit. Econ.
118 (3), 485–535.
Saiz, A., 2010. The geographic determinants of housing supply. Q. J. Econ. 125 (3),
1253–1296.
Shiller, R.J., 2003. From efficient markets theory to behavioral finance. J. Econ. Perspect.
17 (1), 83–104.
Sinai, T., Waldfogel, J., 2005. Do low-income housing subsidies increase the occupied
housing stock? J. Publ. Econ. 89, 2137–2164.
So, K., 2007. The Stigma Effect of Unnatural Deaths on Nearby Property Values.
University of Hong Kong (dissertation).
Thaler, R.H., 2006. Behavioral economics: past, present, and future. Am. Econ. Rev. 106
(7), 1577–1600.
Vyse, S.A., 1997. Believing in Magic: the Psychology of Superstition. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, England.
Walter, T., 1991. Modern death: taboo or not taboo? Sociology 25 (2), 293–310.
Zhang, Y., Risen, J.L., Hosey, C., 2013. Reversing one's fortune by pushing away bad luck.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143 (3), 1171–1184.
Z. Chang, J. Li Regional Science and Urban Economics 73 (2018) 112–126
126
